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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STfATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent. : Case No. 870470 
• 
vs. : 
LONNIE L. MOORE, : Priority 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT^ 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1987) after a trial in the Seventh District 
Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTEp ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to submit 
to the jury, in addition to the given lesser included offense 
instruction, additional lesser included offense instructions 
offered by defendant. 
2. Whether the court should havfe found, as a matter of 
law, that defendant was entrapped. 
3. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) violates the 
due process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions 
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by imposing an enhanced penalty for violations taking place 
within 1/000 feet of a school. 
4. Whether the application of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-
8(5) to defendant, a small town drug dealer, violates the equal 
protection clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
5. Whether Utah Code. Ann. S 58-37-8(5)(d) violates 
the due process clause of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions by precluding as a defense lack of knowledge about 
the proximity of a school. 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself/ nor be deprived of life, liberty/ or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV* 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
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Constitution of Utah, Art. I S It 
No person shall be deprived df life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8. 
(1) Prohibited acts A —Penalties! 
(a) Except as authorized by this 
chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agjqee, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute 
or counterfeit substance: 
la controlled 
or subsequent 
lis guilty of 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (1) 
(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified i^i Schedule I 
or II is, upon conviction, guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second 
conviction of Subsection (l)(a) 
a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classifed [feic] in 
Schedule III or IV, or marihuana is, upon 
conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction 
punishable under this subsectionl is guilty of 
a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified 
V is, upon conviction, guilty of 
misdemeanor and upon a second or 
conviction punishable under this 
in Schedule 
a class A 
subsequent 
subsection 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited act E —Penaltiesi 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of 
this section, a person not authorized under 
this chapter who commits any actI declared to 
be unlawful under this section, chapter 3a, 
Title 58, the Drug Paraphernalia|Act, or 
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, thelImitation 
Controlled Substances Act, shallL upon 
conviction, be subjected to the penalties and 
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classifications under Subsection (5) (b) if 
the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary 
or secondary school or on the grounds of any 
of those schools; 
(ii) in those portions of any 
building, park, stadium, or other structure 
or grounds which are, at the time of the act, 
being used for an activity sponsored by or 
through a school under Subsection (5)(a)(1); 
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any 
structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii); or 
(iv) with a person younger than 18 
years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this 
subsection is guilty of a first degree felony 
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not 
less than five years if the penalty that 
would otherwise have been established but for 
this subsection would have been a first 
degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, nor may 
the person be eligible for parole until the 
minimum term of imprisonment under this 
subsection has been served. 
(c) If the classification that would 
otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for 
this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution 
under this subsection that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 
years of age or older at the time of the 
offense, or was unaware of the individual's 
true age; nor that the actor mistakenly 
believed that the location where the act 
occurred was not as described in Subsection 
(5)(a) or was unaware that the location where 
the act occurred was as described in 
Subsection (5)(a). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his 
conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, 
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with 
a mental state otherwise specified in the 
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statute defining the offense, as the 
definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense 
involving strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility 
shall not apply to the violations set forth 
in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically 
provided by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of distributing a 
controlled substance for value, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1) (a\) (ii) (Supp. 1987). 
Defendant was found guilty on November 13,| 1987, after a jury 
trial in the Seventh Judicial District Co^rt, in and for Grand 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 16, 1986, Detectivel Kelly met with police 
informer Daniel Ward in connection with th^ latter's aid in the 
location and arrest of drug offenders (T. 47-48). At 
approximately 6:00 p.m. on that same day, Kr. Ward introduced 
Detective Kelly, to "Blue," a man who was later identified as 
defendant (T. 48A, 52). Mr. Ward's decisipn to name defendant 
was motivated by the fact that defendant h£d offered to obtain a 
"quantity" of drugs for him earlier that d^y (T. 130). 
Defendant invited Detective Kelly and Mr. Ward into 
defendant's residence where, after some small talk, Mr. Ward told 
defendant that they wanted to obtain "an eighth of a crystal" of 
-crack" (methamphetamine) (T. 48A, 53). F^r that purpose, Ward 
and Kelly gave defendant $275, the amount hecessary to obtain the 
drug (T. 53). After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the 
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methamphetamine, defendant offered to try to obtain cocaine (T. 
54, 67). Unable to obtain cocaine at that time, defendant then 
offered to keep the money and try again the next day to obtain 
the methamphetamine (T. 55, 68). 
On the following day, defendant obtained and delivered 
a bindle of methamphetamine to Mr. Ward, in the presence of Det. 
Kelly (T. 57, 60, 107). At that time, defendant asked Mr. Ward 
to Mcut him a line" from the bindle as the prearranged payment 
for obtaining the drugs (T. 57-58, 70). Defendant told Ward and 
Kelly they could come back again for more drugs (T. 59). 
Defendant's residence is near the Grand County Middle 
School (T. 82-87). On one approach it is 482'7M from the school 
yard (T. 82) and on another it is 568'7M (T. 83). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the 
lesser included offense: distribution of a controlled substance 
without value. Defendant is not entitled to repetitive 
instructions and therefore, the court correctly refused to 
include defendant's other requested instructions. 
Moreover, defendant's additional instructions would not 
have altered the outcome of the trial. The evidence shows that 
defendant received value for his services. Therefore, the court 
did not commit reversible error. 
2. There was sufficient evidence at trial to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped. 
Defendant was not pressured into obtaining the drugs, but his 
acts were spontaneous and voluntary. 
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In addition, the informant's relationship with 
defendant was purely a "business" one and not the type of 
relationship which suggests improper inducement or extreme pleas 
based upon an intimate friendship• Therefore, defendant was not 
entitled to a finding of entrapment as a matter of law. 
3. Defendant was not denied due| process or equal 
protection by the statutory enhancement ofl his crime for sale of 
drugs within 1000 feet of school property Without regard to 
defendant's knowledge that he was located hear the school. The 
statute does not create an irrebuttable presumption of such 
knowledge, rather it holds defendant strictly liable for his acts 
committed near a school. 
Nor does the statute unconstitutionally treat defendant 
differently than large town drug dealers merely because it is 
possible that a greater number of drug sal^s in small towns might 
occur within the 1000 foot radius than in JLarge towns. Even if 
the statute does affect a proportionately larger percentage of 
small town dealers more harshly, such a re$ult is not 
constitutionally prohibited since small to\|m drug dealers enjoy 
no special protection for their status as ^uch. 
4. The strict liability sentence enhancement provision 
for sale of drugs near a school does not violate due process by 
eliminating the mens rea for the criminal act of selling drugs or 
eliminating the State's burden of proof, the drug sale must 
still be intentional or knowing and the State must prove that the 
sale occurred within 1000 feet of school property beyond a 
reasonable doubt. That the State is not statutorily required to 
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establish defendant's knowledge of his location is not a 
constitutional violation. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITHOUT VALUE. 
Pursuant to defendant's requested instruction No. 3, 
the trial court instructed the jury on distribution of a 
controlled substance without value as a lesser included offense 
of the crime charged (See Jury Instruction No. 6) (R. 63). In 
fact# the court's jury instruction was defendant's requested 
instruction, verbatim (R. 55, 63). In addition, the trial court 
instructed the jury that 
In construing and interpreting these 
instructions, the following definitions shall 
apply ... The meaning of the term 
"distribute for value" means to deliver a 
controlled substance in exchange for 
compensation, consideration, or item of 
value, or a promise therefore [sic]. 
Jury Instruction No. 5 (R. 62). 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred 
in denying two of his requested instructions, apparently ignoring 
the fact that the court did give the aforementioned lesser 
included offense instruction. While a defendant is entitled to 
an instruction on his or her theory of the case, State v. 
McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 1980), the defendant is not 
entitled to multiple instructions setting forth the same theory 
of the case. State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant requested that the court, in addition to 
defining what distribution for value dj>, define what it is not. 
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Such an instruction was unnecessary where the given instructions 
adequately defined the offense. The court should not be required 
to instruct the jury on every fact scenario that could be 
eliminated from the charged offense along with those that 
constitute the offense. 
Nor is there prejudicial error i£ the giving of a 
party's requested instructions would not hkve affected the 
outcome of the trial. State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 359 (Utah 
1980). In the instant case, the trial couirt properly gave 
defendant's instructions on the lesser-included offense along 
with a clarifying additional instruction. Defendant's additional 
requested instruction, at most, attempted Similar clarification 
by exclusion rather inclusion. Since the trial court provided 
adequate instructions defining the offense^ defendant was not 
entitled to his requested instructions No. 1 and No. 2. 
In addition, the outcome of the trial would not have 
been affected by defendant's requested instructions because the 
evidence clearly shows that defendant distributed the controlled 
substance in exchange for a "line." At tr^al one of the 
undercover detectives testified as follows4 
Q. Why did he cut a line? 
A. It had been pre-arranged by the defendant 
that he wanted a line for obtaining the 
controlled substance for us; and as he 
delivered it, he indicated he warited a line 
for getting the controlled substance for us. 
(T. 58) (see also T. 136, 141). 
It is irrelevant that, as defendant argues, defendant "cut a 
line" only after he delivered the substance. The facts in this 
case do not support defendant's contention that all the officer 
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did was "6hare" the drugs with a friend rather than pay defendant 
with the "line." 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 
103 (1983) is misplaced. In that case, not only was there no 
pre-arranged "payment" to the defendant for obtaining the drugs, 
but the defendant's agency was clearly established by the fact 
that he attempted to buy part of the drugs from the undercover 
officer. Defendant also fails to distinguish State v. Udell, 728 
P. 2d 188 (1986) from the instant case. Like in that case, 
defendant in the instant case took the money and left in search 
of the drugs (T. 53, 67-68). It makes no difference whether the 
defendant profited from the transaction or not. Ici. at 134. In 
fact, the instant case suggests more strongly than Udell that 
defendant received value for the substance given the existence of 
the pre-arrangement in the instant case, which was missing in 
Udell. Given the overwhelming evidence showing that defendant 
received value for delivery of the controlled substance, it is 
unlikely that the jury would have convicted defendant of the 
lesser included offense even if defendant's other two 
instructions had been given. Further, because the court's 
instructions properly and adequately informed the jury of the 
lesser included offense and defined the acts necessary to 
establish the "for value" prong of the offense, the court's 
denial of defendant's requested instructions was not error. 
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POINT II 
THE JURY'S FINDING BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT 
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPEI} IS AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
At trial, defendant raised the JJssue of entrapment 
based on two different grounds. First, defendant moved to 
dismiss the case alleging that the police agents had no knowledge 
of defendant's drug-related activities prior to the investigation 
(R. 5-10). The court denied this motion (^. 10). Subsequently, 
defendant testified in support of his entrapment defense that Dan 
Ward was his close friend (T. 122). Defense counsel emphasized 
this point in closing argument (T. 168). Oh appeal, defendant 
pursues only the latter theory of his entrapment defense; that 
the evidence establishes the entrapment defense as a matter of 
law, based on his alleged friendship with the police informant. 
In State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), this 
Court set forth the standard to establish the entrapment defense 
as follows: 
[T]he test to determine an unlawful 
entrapment is whether a law enforcement 
official or an agent, in order to obtain 
evidence of the commission of an offense, 
induced the defendant to commit such an 
offense by persuasion or inducement which 
would be effective to persuade an average 
person, other than one who was merely given 
the opportunity to commit the offense. 
Id. at 503 (emphasis added). 
In State v. Salmon, 612 P.2d 366^ 369 (Utah 1980), this 
Court established the standard of review of jury decisions on the 
entrapment defense: 
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Where there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence upon which jurors could believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was 
a result of a defendant's own voluntary 
desire and intent to commit the crime, the 
fact that a police officer merely afforded 
him the opportunity to commit it, does not 
amount to entrapment, (Citation omitted.) 
The trial court instructed the jury on the entrapment 
defense, consistent with Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303 (1978) and 
this Court's decisions based on that statute, as set forth above 
(T. 154-5). Nevertheless, the jury found defendant guilty as 
charged (T. 173-4). 
The evidence introduced at trial provided a reasonable 
basis upon which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant was merely given an opportunity to voluntarily 
commit the crime. The State introduced evidence that defendant's 
participation was not the product of persuasion or inducement on 
the part of either the undercover agent or the informant, but a 
purely voluntary act. There was evidence presented at trial that 
defendant was a regular supplier of drugs for the informant (T. 
130-131, 139-140). 
Further, defendant actively participated in the 
initiative to obtain drugs for the undercover agent and the 
informant. Before the informant met with the undercover agents, 
defendant offered him drugs "in quantity" (T. 130). In 
defendant's house, neither the agent nor the informant insisted 
upon getting the drugs, but defendant took the initiative to get 
them right away (T. 53). Once the initial attempt to obtain 
methamphetamine failed, defendant voluntarily offered to obtain 
cocaine (T. 54). Finally, failing to obtain the substance for 
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the second time, defendant spontaneously requested to keep the 
money overnight to make a further attempt during the next day (T. 
55). This evidence supports the jury's finding that defendant's 
actions were voluntary and not the product of improper persuasion 
or inducement. 
Defendant mistakenly relies on ^tate v. Taylor, 599 
P.2d 496 (Utah 1979), claiming that, as ih that case, defendant's 
relationship with the informant was such that the entrapment 
defense was established as a matter of la\^ . In that case, this 
Court stated: 
Extreme pleas of desperate illnelss or appeals 
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close 
friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of 
money, are examples, depending on an 
evaluation of the circumstances in each case, 
of what might constitute prohibited police 
conduct. 
Id. at 599 P.2d 496, 503 (Utah 1979). Accordingly, the Court 
found that Taylor was entrapped, partly ba^ed on his close, 
intimate relationship with the police informant. 
The instant case is distinguishable from Taylor. Not 
only did the informant and defendant lack j:he sort of close 
friendship established in Taylor, there is evidence tending to 
show that their relationship was strictly ihat between a drug 
supplier and a drug buyer (T. 139-140). The jury was not 
required to believe defendant's self-serving contradictory 
testimony that he was just doing a favor f6r a very close friend. 
State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986) Even so, 
defendant's description of the relationship did not create the 
type of compelling circumstance that existed in Taylor and the 
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jury could believe the two were friends without also finding that 
defendant was entrapped. Taylor does not hold that merely 
establishing that the accused was friendly with the informer or 
agent amounts to entrapment as a matter of law. Taylor 
contemplates the existence of much more compelling circumstances 
that would persuade someone to commit the crime who was not 
already willing, given the opportunity. For these reasons 
defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
THE INCREASED PENALTY IMPOSED BY UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-8(5) IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DUE 
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
Defendant claims that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(5) 
(Supp. 1987), which increases the penalty for certain drug 
transactions that occur on, or within 1,000 feet of, a school 
ground, is unconstitutional. Defendant first contends that the 
statute violates the due process clause by creating an 
irrebuttable presumption that children are either witnesses to 
or "victims" of the drug transaction. 
The subject statute does not create an irrebuttable 
presumption that children are present during the criminal 
conduct. It neither presumes nor requires the actual presence of 
a child during the drug transaction. Instead, the statute 
protects against the extreme potential for damage created by the 
criminal conduct when performed on or near school grounds. 
Dealing drugs on or near a school ground greatly increases the 
risk that children will be targeted as customers, thus, 
increasing drug use and dependency among children. 
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Unquestionably, the State has a compelling interest "in 
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor.- New York v. Ferber# 458 U.S. 755, 756-7 (1982) (quoting 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
This compelling interest sustains legislation aimed at protecting 
the physical and emotional well-being of children "even when the 
laws have operated in the sensitive area of constitutionally 
protected rights." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757. In the instant 
case, the Legislature took measures to protect the children of 
Utah from the extreme potential danger created where drug 
transactions occur on or near a school ground. This Court should 
not intervene to defeat the statute's legitimate goal. 
Moreover, defendant fails to shoy how this element of 
the crime violates his due process rights. Defendant cites 
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1987) for phe proposition that 
the Supreme Court disfavors irrebuttable presumptions. However, 
defendant fails to explain why the alleged presumptions should be 
disfavored in this case. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions of 
the Supreme Court have severely limited Vlftndis. See Gorrie v. 
Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 524 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1$87) ("'legitimate 
doubt' whether anything remains of Vlandis]'). 
In addition, this case is distinguishable from Vlandis. 
In that case as well as in the cases cited therein, the 
complaining party argued that the statute in question deprived 
him or her of a fundamental right without due process of law. A 
group of university students challenged th0 constitutionality of 
a statute in Vlandis which defined residency for purposes of 
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tuition in a way that denied them the opportunity to show their 
qualification as residents. The Court held that the statute 
deprived the student of property without due process. 
Defendant does not argue, nor is there a basis to 
assert, that a similar violation has taken place here. Defendant 
has no fundamental right to sell drugs, let alone to sell them 
near school facilities. The subject statute is not determinative 
of guilt or innocence, nor does it enhance the offender's 
culpability, as defendant repeatedly suggests. As previously 
discussed, the statute's increased penalty is consistent with the 
State's legitimate interest in protecting the emotional and 
physical well-being of Utah's children. 
Concerning the theft statute increasing the penalty for 
identical criminal conduct committed under special circumstances, 
this Court stated: 
It is not unconstitutional for a state to 
impose a more severe penalty for a particular 
type of crime than the penalty which is 
imposed with respect to the general category 
of crimes to which the special crime is 
related or of which it is a subcategory. 
State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1981) (citing Rammell v. 
Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977)). Accordingly, in this case, 
the increased punishment for an offense committed under special 
circumstances is not unconstitutional. 
Defendant also contends that Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-
8(5) violates due process by failing to consider the physical 
circumstances of small town drug dealers. Since defendant fails 
to support his argument with legal analysis or case citation, 
this Court should not review his contention. See State v. 
Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984). 
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Finally, defendant contends that S 58-37-8(5) violates 
the equal protection clause of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions by Htreat[ing] defendants in small towns 
differently from those in large cities." Appellant's Brief at 
17. Yet, the statute's language clearly aipplies to all 
individuals who deal in drugs within 1,000 feet of school 
grounds, regardless of the geographic location of the school. 
Apparently, what defendant attempts to argue is that, 
while the statute appears facially neutral|, its application has 
the effect of treating small town dealers differently from large 
city dealers since he claims that in smalll towns the likelihood 
of the criminal conduct taking place within 1,000 feet of a 
school ground is greater, small-town drug dealers are more likely 
to be subject to the higher penalty impose^ by the statute. 
Admittedly, it is possible that the statute could enhance the 
punishment of a greater percentage of smalfL-town drug dealers 
than of their large city counterparts. However, such an effect 
is not constitutionally proscribed. Small town drug dealers do 
not fall within any specially protected group, and there is no 
constitutional prohibition against treating larger numbers of a 
non-suspect group more harshly than members of a similar group 
based upon their choice of residence. Givfen that the intent of 
the law has a rational relation to the State's interest in 
protecting its children's emotional and physical well-being, the 
statute does not violate equal protection in any event. 
While generally, a statute may n^t treat those 
similarly situated differently, equal prot0ction of the law 
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provisions do not prevent different treatment "as long as there 
is a reasonable basis for the difference." State v. Bishop, 717 
P.2d 261, 266 (Utah 1986). In the instant case, the State has a 
strong legitimate interest in protecting its children from drug 
use and dependency. As previously discussed, drug dealing near 
school grounds creates an extreme potential for harm to children, 
in that children are likely to be targeted as "customers" or be 
exposed to a potentially violent criminal element of society. 
This potential exists in small towns and large cities alike. But 
most importantly, while drug dealing is more likely to take place 
near school grounds in a small town, the potential risk of 
children becoming targets is proportionately greater. 
The enhanced effect of the statute in small towns is 
reasonable in light of the proportionately greater potential risk 
which the statute was designed to prevent. In turn, the 
establishment of safeguards to protect children from drug 
exposure and dependency is consistent with the State's interest 
in protecting its children's emotional and physical well-being. 
Therefore, the statute does not violate the equal protection 
clause. 
POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-37-8(1)(a) SUPPLIES THE 
MENS REA FOR DEFENDANT'S CRIMINAL ACT, 
THEREFORE, HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE NOT 
VIOLATED BY THE STRICT LIABILITY SENTENCE 
ENHANCEMENT PROVISION. 
Utah Code S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) makes it illegal to 
intentionally and knowingly distribute a controlled substance as 
specified therein. Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(5) imposes an 
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enhanced penalty for that offense when committed within 1,000 
feet of a school ground. Utah Code Ann. £ 58-37-8(5)(d) 
establishes that the offender's lack of knowledge about the 
proximity of a school is no defense. Defendant argues that the 
latter provision violates due process by Allegedly (1) creating 
an irrebuttable presumption; (2) eliminating the mens rea 
requirement for the offense; and (3) relieving the State of its 
burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Defendant's first and last contentions presuppose that 
knowledge of the proximity of a school is or should be an element 
of the offense for which he was charged. Defendant's first 
contention merely repeats his due process argument in Point III 
of his brief. Yet, the statute neither presumes nor requires 
knowledge of the aggravating factor's presence as an element of 
the offense. Again, the absence of such a^  requirement is 
consistent with the State's legitimate interest in protecting its 
children's physical and emotional well-being. Since § 58-37-8(5) 
makes it irrelevant whether the offender knows that he or she is 
near a school, it does not create a presumption that he or she 
possesses such knowledge. Rather, sale of drugs near a school is 
a strict liability enhancement provision. 
On the other hand, the same absence of a requirement of 
knowledge as to the aggravating factor's presence precludes 
defendant's third contention. If knowledge of that factor is not 
an element of the offense, the State need hot prove defendant's 
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the statute 
would not violate due process on that accotint. 
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In his second contention defendant mistakenly states 
that 5 58-37-8(5)(d) eliminates the mens rea requirement for the 
offense for which he was charged. Defendant was convicted of 
distribution of a controlled substance for value in violation of 
S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). That section requires intentional and 
knowing distribution as grounds for conviction. Section 58-37-
8(5)(d) does not eliminate this mens rea requirement. 
Section 58-37-8(5) does not create a separate offense 
that requires an additional mens rea. It simply enhances the 
penalty for an offense already defined, when the offense is 
committed under special circumstances. In this sense it is 
comparable to other statutes which establish the degree of an 
offense, or enhance the penalty, under special circumstances. 
The Utah theft statute, for example, classifies the degree of the 
crime according to the value of the property taken without regard 
to whether the actor knew of the value of the property. See Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-412 (1978). Nor does the theft statute require 
that the offender intend to take property valued in a particular 
amount for penalty purposes. 
Section 58-37-8(5) is also similar to statutes which 
enhance the penalty imposed upon a person who kills a police 
officer. The constitutionality of such a statute was upheld in 
another jurisdiction against a similar claim in spite of the fact 
that the statute does not require that the offender know that the 
victim is a police officer. See State v. Compton, 726 P.2d 837 
(N.M. 1986). 
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:son In Utah, criminal responsibility attaches when a pen 
acts "with a mental state specified in th^ statute defining the 
offense." Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-101(1) ($upp. 1987). The law 
does not require that each element of the offense include a 
corresponding culpable mental state. Interestingly, the former 
Utah statue defining criminal responsibility required just that. 
See Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-101(1) (1978). The statute was amended 
in 1983, eliminating the requirement. (Compare with Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-2-101(1) (Supp. 1987)). 
In the instant case, S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) defines the 
offense for which defendant was charged, requiring that the 
conduct be intentional and knowing. Sectibn 58-37-8(5) merely 
enhances the penalty when an aggravating factor is present. Utah 
law does not require that the aggravating Element be accompanied 
by a mens rea. Therefore, S 58-37-8(5)(d) which eliminates lack 
of knowledge about the aggravating factor'b presence as a defense 
for the enhanced penalty does not violate due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the St^te requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's conviction and minim|im mandatory sentence. 
DATED THIS J^ti DAY OF JULY, 1968. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
a /^? /* 
ANDRA L. 3c UU 
Assistants-Attorney General 
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